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[1501] 
Lost in the Fog of Miranda 
George C. Thomas III* 
For over two centuries, Anglo-American law used a test of “voluntariness” to determine 
the admissibility of confessions. The twentieth century saw increasing skepticism that law 
can determine which conscious utterances are “voluntary” and which are not. Suspects 
who speak to police do so because they choose to speak rather than the alternative. If the 
alternative is torture, that feels involuntary. But if it is merely a lengthy interrogation, who 
can “prove” that the choice to answer is involuntary? Miranda v. Arizona was, in part, 
the Court’s response to this skepticism. If judges cannot tell which utterances are 
voluntary, why not give control of the interrogation over to the suspect? By telling the 
suspect that he has a right to silence and a right to consult with counsel, police provide the 
suspect with choices beyond answering or not answering questions. Thus, any subsequent 
choice to talk to police is likely voluntary. But Miranda’s apparently elegant “free choice” 
principle has metastasized into a dizzying array of formalistic doctrines and sub-
doctrines. This Essay documents the lower court confusion over one of the sub-
doctrines—the exception for so-called “booking questions.” 
 
 * Rutgers University Board of Governors Professor of Law and Judge Alexander P. Waugh, Sr. 
Distinguished Scholar. I benefitted greatly from editorial assistance and an excellent memorandum on 
the circuit split on this issue by Lauren Garcia, Rutgers School of Law—Newark, Class of 2013. 
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Introduction 
The Supreme Court has identified a “booking question” exception to 
the Miranda v. Arizona1 warning and waiver regime.2 The notion is that 
police should not have to give warnings before asking an arrestee his name 
and address. The Court, however, has never defined what it means by 
“booking questions.” 
This Essay will discuss a circuit split on that issue. Three approaches 
to defining the exception have arisen. I will argue that, oddly enough, the 
approach that has been adopted by only one circuit is far superior to the 
other two approaches that have been widely adopted. I will attempt to 
explain why the circuits that have adopted the other two approaches have 
become lost in the fog of Miranda. 
I.  Setting the Scene: Our Old Friend MIRANDA 
The Warren Court undoubtedly had multiple goals in mind when 
deciding Miranda, its most sweeping—and probably most controversial—
criminal procedure case. Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court is 
replete with references to the uneven, and hence unfair, playing field of 
the police interrogation room. Early in the opinion, the Court accuses 
the police in the cases before the Court of “incommunicado interrogation 
of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-
incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.”3 
Warren gives many examples from the Inbau-Reid police 
interrogation manual of techniques that police can use to move suspects to 
 
 1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 2. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980). 
 3. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. 
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confess when they might otherwise have chosen to remain silent.4 These 
include trickery, relentless interrogation, pretending sympathy, and 
offering legal excuses that turn out not to be valid. A favorite example of 
trickery is to have fictitious eyewitnesses pick the suspect out of a lineup 
involving other, more serious offenses.5 One of the police manuals 
explains: “It is expected that the subject will become desperate and confess 
to the offense under investigation in order to escape from the false 
accusations.”6 
Warren also describes two of the four appellants in ways intended to 
evoke sympathy from the reader: “The potentiality for compulsion is 
forcefully apparent, for example, in Miranda, where the indigent 
Mexican defendant was a seriously disturbed individual with pronounced 
sexual fantasies, and in Stewart, in which the defendant was an indigent 
Los Angeles Negro who had dropped out of school in the sixth grade.”7 
The opinion also resoundingly embraces notions of autonomy and 
freedom from state power. Tracing the Fifth Amendment Self-
Incrimination Clause back to John Lilburn and the Whigs, the Court notes: 
We sometimes forget how long it has taken to establish the privilege 
against self-incrimination, the sources from which it came and the fervor 
with which it was defended. Its roots go back into ancient times. Perhaps 
the critical historical event shedding light on its origins and evolution was 
the trial of one John Lilburn, a vocal anti-Stuart Leveller, who was made 
to take the Star Chamber Oath in 1637. The oath would have bound him 
to answer to all questions posed to him on any subject. He resisted the 
oath and declaimed the proceedings, stating: 
 “Another fundamental right I then contended for, was, that no 
man’s conscience ought to be racked by oaths imposed, to answer 
to questions concerning himself in matters criminal, or pretended 
to be so.” 
  On account of the Lilburn Trial, Parliament abolished the 
inquisitorial Court of Star Chamber . . . . We cannot depart from this 
noble heritage.8 
But beyond its embrace of autonomy, fairness, and individual 
liberty, the Court must have intended its comprehensive re-writing of 
Anglo-American interrogation law to provide more clarity and certainty 
than the hoary “voluntariness” doctrine that had been around since the 
1600s. The notion underlying that doctrine, which appears in a 
rudimentary form in a 1295 English case,9 is that confessions that are not 
 
 4. Id. at 449–55. 
 5. See id. at 453. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 457. 
 8. Id. at 458–60 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
 9. Y.B. 23 Edw. 1, fol. RS 543–45, pl. App. II [23] (1295) (Eng.), available at http://www.bu.edu/ 
phpbin/lawyearbooks/display.php?id=1171 (Seipp No. 1295.023rs). Richard Leo and I discuss this case 
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the product of the will of the defendant should not be used to convict 
him. While the underlying intuition is attractive, the concept is ultimately 
unsound, if not incoherent. As Wigmore pointed out over a century ago, 
confessions entail a conscious choice, and thus all confessions “are and 
must be voluntary.”10 Or, more colorfully, “between the rack and a false 
confession, the latter would usually be considered the less disagreeable; 
but it is none the less voluntarily chosen.”11 Aristotle recognized the 
problem in identifying involuntary human acts when humans choose a 
disagreeable option: “Such acts, therefore, are voluntary; but in the 
abstract perhaps involuntary, for no one would choose any such act in 
itself.”12 
Justice Frankfurter, one of the Court’s deepest thinkers, tried to 
save the Supreme Court’s voluntariness doctrine from incoherence. As 
Louis Seidman has noted, throughout Frankfurter’s “long and brilliant 
career” he “returned to the confession problem with obsessive regularity. 
The story of his ultimate, utterly abject and deeply personal failure to 
make sense of the area poignantly embodies all of the difficulties” in the 
voluntariness inquiry.13 
In 1961, Frankfurter made a last, valiant effort in Culombe v. 
Connecticut, writing a lengthy, scholarly opinion that sought to create a 
jurisprudential framework within which the suspect’s internal psychological 
state could be inferred from “external, ‘phenomenological’ occurrences 
and events.”14 It was a spectacular failure. Though Frankfurter announced 
the judgment of the Court, which meant he had been assigned the 
“majority” opinion, only Justice Stewart joined Frankfurter’s opinion. 
Chief Justice Warren agreed that the confessions were inadmissible, 
but refused to join Frankfurter’s opinion because it “has not been the 
custom of the Court . . . to write lengthy and abstract dissertations” when 
deciding cases.15 Justices Douglas, Black, and Brennan agreed that the 
confessions were inadmissible and also refused to join Frankfurter’s 
opinion.16 Perhaps even more devastating to Frankfurter’s attempt to 
 
in George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, Confessions of Guilt: From Torture to MIRANDA and 
Beyond 24–26 (2012). 
 10. 2 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials 
at Common Law § 824, at 145 (2d ed. 1923). 
 11. Id. 
 12. 2 The Complete Works of Aristotle, bk. III, § 1, at 1752–53 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984). 
 13. See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 Calif. L. Rev. 673, 729–30 (1992) 
(footnote omitted). 
 14. 367 U.S. 568, 603 (1961). 
 15. Id. at 635–36 (Warren, C.J., concurring). 
 16. See id. at 637 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring). The opinions of 
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas are labeled as “concurring” opinions, but they both make 
clear that they are not joining Frankfurter’s opinion. Id. at 636, 639–41. 
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bring clarity to the confessions problem, Justices Harlan, Clark, and 
Whittaker accepted his analytical structure and reached precisely the 
opposite conclusion—that the confession was voluntary: “The Justices 
who concurred on an analytical framework for resolving the problem 
disagreed on the result . . . while the Justices who concurred on the result 
disagreed on the analytic framework producing that result. In short, the 
Culombe opinion was a total disaster.”17 If Aristotle, Wigmore, and 
Frankfurter could not make sense of the voluntary/involuntary distinction 
when it came to conscious choices, no one was going to succeed. 
Miranda was the new broom that sweeps clean. The Court admitted 
that in “these cases, we might not find the defendants’ statements to have 
been involuntary in traditional terms,”18 and it explicitly replaced the 
voluntariness test with an elaborate requirement to ensure that suspects 
chose to answer police questions in an exercise of their will. Thus the 
Court required police, prior to custodial interrogation, to provide the 
now-famous warnings of the right to remain silent and the right to 
counsel. At one level, Miranda succeeded brilliantly. In the vast majority 
of cases, police give the warnings, the suspect waives the rights, and the 
resulting statements are introduced without an argument about whether 
they were voluntary.19 Simplicity and clarity are achieved. 
Where Miranda has failed to achieve simplicity and clarity, however, 
is in the vast doctrinal web that the Supreme Court has spun over the last 
half century while working out the details of the Miranda regime. 
“Custody” and “interrogation” had to be defined in a series of cases.20 
Waiver has, until recently, proved to be a doctrinally thorny problem.21 
We learned that the failure to give warnings did not usually poison later 
statements after warnings were belatedly given.22 We learned that 
 
 17. Seidman, supra note 13, at 733. 
 18. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966). 
 19. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study 
of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 839, 858–62 (1996); Richard A. Leo, Inside the 
Interrogation Room, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 266, 282–83 (1996); George C. Thomas III, Stories 
About Miranda, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1959, 1962–74 (2004). 
 20. See generally Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181 (2012) (custody); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 
131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (custody); Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010) (custody); Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (custody); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (interrogation); 
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (interrogation); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) 
(custody). 
 21. See generally Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98; United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004); Davis v. 
United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990); Colorado v. Spring, 
479 U.S. 564 (1987); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 
(1983); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); 
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010), has largely 
solved the doctrinal problem by holding that the State proves waiver when a suspect is given warnings, 
there is no evidence that he does not understand the warnings, and he answers police questions. 
 22. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
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physical evidence is admissible even if found by virtue of statements 
made without warnings.23 We learned that there is an exception for 
situations where public safety is threatened; no warnings are necessary in 
those situations.24 I turn now to the booking question exception. 
II.  Establishing, and Complicating, an Exception to MIRANDA 
The Court told us in dicta in 1980, and in a later plurality opinion, 
that there is an exception to the Miranda requirement of warnings and 
waiver for “booking questions.”25 My thesis is that the Miranda doctrinal 
web has become so complex that most courts have lost sight of the 
reason that there is a booking question exception in the first place. If 
courts cannot reason their way through the relatively simple notion of a 
booking question exception, one wonders how well they are applying the 
other complex doctrines and sub-doctrines of Miranda. This raises the 
possibility that while Miranda can be judged a success at the pragmatic, 
day-to-day level, it might be as much a doctrinal failure as the 
voluntariness test that it replaced. 
A. The Exception Emerges 
To understand the booking question exception, it helps to begin 
with Miranda. Warnings are not required for every interaction between 
police and potential suspects, but are only required when the police 
conduct custodial interrogation. It is custodial interrogation that the 
Court identified as the cause of the inherent compulsion that potentially 
deprives suspects of the “free choice” to decide whether to answer police 
questions. Custody is generally going to be present in every case where a 
suspect is asked booking questions after being arrested, so the issue 
becomes whether booking questions constitute “interrogation” for 
purposes of Miranda. 
The Court defined “interrogation” in Rhode Island v. Innis as not 
only “express questioning” but also “any words or actions on the part of 
the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that 
the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from the suspect.”26 That leaves open the issue of how to 
determine whether questions are considered “normally attendant to arrest 
and custody” and thus exempt from the Innis definition of interrogation. 
 
 23. See generally Patane, 542 U.S. 630. 
 24. See generally New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Innis, 446 U.S. 291. 
 25. See generally Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990); Innis, 446 U.S. 291. 
 26. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. 
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B. The Exception Clouds: PENNSYLVANIA V. MUNIZ 
Part of the complexity results from Pennsylvania v. Muniz,27 a badly 
split 1990 opinion that failed to clarify the scope of the “booking 
question” category. Eight members of the Court agreed that the answers 
to seven routine booking questions—questions that elicited answers 
about the suspect’s name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of 
birth, and current age—were admissible.28 But the Court split 4–4 as to 
why (Justice Marshall dissented). 
Justice Brennan, who announced the opinion of the Court, would 
have held that the answers were admissible because they “fall within a 
‘routine booking question’ exception which exempts from Miranda’s 
coverage questions to secure the ‘biographical data necessary to complete 
booking or pretrial services.’”29 The plurality also embraced the view of the 
state court “that the first seven questions were ‘requested for record-
keeping purposes only,’ and therefore the questions appear reasonably 
related to the police’s administrative concerns.”30 This rationale seems 
consistent with the language from Innis suggesting an exception to the 
“should-have-known” rule for questions “normally attendant to arrest and 
custody.” But five members of the Court rejected the plurality’s view. 
Justice Marshall, writing alone, said the booking question exception 
would necessitate difficult, time-consuming litigation over whether 
particular questions asked during booking are “routine,” whether they 
are necessary to secure biographical information, whether that 
information is itself necessary for recordkeeping purposes, and 
whether the questions are—despite their routine nature—designed to 
elicit incriminating testimony.31 
Instead, Marshall would have opted for a rule that was faithful to 
“Miranda’s fundamental principle that the doctrine should be clear so 
that it can be easily applied by both police and courts.”32 Thus, the “far 
better course would be to maintain the clarity of the doctrine by 
requiring police to preface all direct questioning of a suspect with 
Miranda warnings if they want his responses to be admissible at trial.”33 
But Marshall wrote alone. Chief Justice Rehnquist, like Brennan 
writing for four members of the Court, raised more complex objections 
to the plurality’s booking question exception. Rehnquist argued that 
answers to questions seeking information do not expose the suspect to 
 
 27. 496 U.S. 592. 
 28.  See id. at 590–92. 
 29. Id. at 601 (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12, 
Muniz, 496 U.S. 592 (No. 89-213)). 
 30. Id. at 601–02 (citation omitted). 
 31. Id. at 610 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 32. Id. at 609. 
 33. Id. at 610. 
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the classic “trilemma” that the Fifth Amendment privilege is supposed to 
avoid.34 In a classic privilege situation, the witness who is under oath is 
asked a question that might require an incriminating response. As the 
Court observed in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York 
Harbor,35 this witness can tell the truth and incriminate himself, testify 
falsely and commit perjury, or remain silent and face contempt of court. 
The Fifth Amendment privilege protects the latter option and thus 
avoids the trilemma. 
Rehnquist said that suspects asked informational questions are not 
subject to this trilemma. In his view, the suspect will not be compelled to 
state a falsehood about his age or name: “Muniz would no more have felt 
compelled to fabricate a false [answer] than one who cannot read the 
letters on an eye chart feels compelled to fabricate false letters; nor does 
a wrong guess call into question a speaker’s veracity.”36 In sum, “the 
potential for giving a bad guess does not subject the suspect to the truth-
falsity-silence predicament that renders a response testimonial and, 
therefore, within the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege.”37 Because 
asking routine questions does not, in the view of four members of the 
Muniz Court, subject a suspect to a threat of compelled self-
incrimination, “it is unnecessary to determine whether the questions fall 
within the ‘routine booking question’ exception to Miranda Justice 
Brennan recognizes.”38 
The Rehnquist opinion is a puzzle. The aspects of routine questioning 
that led him to find that it does not threaten compulsory self-incrimination 
are the same aspects that presumably led Justice Brennan to conclude that 
routine booking questions are an exception to Miranda, yet Rehnquist, 
speaking for four justices, refused to join the booking question part of 
Brennan’s opinion. Thus, there is technically no majority opinion on 
Brennan’s routine booking question exception, but eight members of the 
Court recognized that routine questions do not threaten the Fifth 
Amendment privilege. I think it is fair to say that there is a “holding” that 
routine questions do not trigger Fifth Amendment privilege protections. 
So as of the Court’s last word on routine questions and the Fifth 
Amendment privilege, here is where we stand: The Court suggested in 
dicta in Innis that questions “normally attendant to arrest and custody” 
do not fall within Miranda, while eight members of the Court in Muniz 
 
 34. Id. at 606 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part, and dissenting 
in part). 
 35. 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). 
 36. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 606 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part, 
and dissenting in part). 
 37. Id. at 608. 
 38. Id. 
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held that routine questions do not implicate the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. The reason is that suspects do not feel the same pressure to 
answer routine booking questions as questions targeted to whether they 
have committed crime. It is a sensible exception to Miranda and the Fifth 
Amendment privilege. 
And how have lower courts responded to this sensible doctrinal 
move on the part of the Supreme Court? Like a child lost in the fog. 
C. Divergent Approaches Ensue: ALFORD V. TEXAS 
The circuit courts of appeals have used three different approaches to 
resolve that issue in the “booking questions” context. To illustrate these 
divergent approaches—and the issues that they raise—consider a case 
where the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari, Alford v. Texas.39 
During the evening of January 29, 2009, police observed Cecil 
Alford getting out of a vehicle with an open container of beer in his 
hand.40 Police approached Alford and asked him if he had any narcotics 
on him. He denied having any drugs or weapons on his person but began 
to back away. Police then informed Alford that he was being detained 
and was not free to leave. When Alford attempted to flee, the officers 
arrested him for evading arrest and drove him to the police station.41 
One of the officers noticed Alford squirming in the back seat. Alford 
claimed it was because his side hurt. After taking Alford out of the patrol 
car, the officers searched the back seat, pursuant to departmental 
procedure, and discovered a computer thumb drive (“flash drive”) directly 
beneath a clear plastic bag containing pills.42 
The officers then escorted Alford to the booking area. While Alford 
was being searched by facility personnel, an officer held up the flash 
drive and, without providing Miranda warnings, asked what it was and 
whether it belonged to him.43 Alford responded that it was a memory 
drive and that it belonged to him. The flash drive was not identified as 
evidence. Rather, it was placed with Alford’s other personal property. 
The pills, however, were identified as evidence, sent away for analysis, 
and revealed to be more than four grams of ecstasy.44 
Alford filed a pretrial motion to exclude his responses to the 
questions regarding the flash drive on the grounds that the questioning 
constituted custodial interrogation and that the failure to provide Miranda 
 
 39. Alford v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 122 (2012). 
 40. Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 650–51. 
 44. Id. at 651. 
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warnings made his responses inadmissible.45 The trial court denied the 
motion and admitted his responses, emphasizing that the flash drive was 
never identified as evidence and concluding that the officer was asking 
routine questions to process Alford’s personal property.46 At trial, the 
prosecution introduced Alford’s statements regarding the flash drive to 
establish his possession of the bag of ecstasy, and the jury convicted him of 
possession of a controlled substance.47 On appeal, the court of appeals 
concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion by admitting 
Alford’s statements because they were made during normal, 
administrative processing.48 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals—the highest court for 
criminal appeals in Texas—affirmed, holding that the test is “whether the 
question reasonably relates to a legitimate administrative concern, 
applying an objective standard.”49 It further held that if a question lacks a 
legitimate administrative concern, then the trial court should determine 
the admissibility of the statement “under the general should-have-known 
test for custodial interrogation” from Innis.50 
The Texas court acknowledged that other courts had taken different 
approaches that could be grouped into two categories.51 First, some 
courts apply the basic definition of interrogation from Innis: “any words 
or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”52 
This is essentially an objective test, though Innis conceded that the 
officer’s subjective intent could be relevant to the objective question.53 
Second, some courts apply a subjective test that turns on whether the 
officer intended to evoke an incriminating response.54 
Almost all courts follow either the basic Innis test or the intent test 
when identifying when questions are subject to the booking question 
exception. As I will seek to show in the rest of this Essay, I believe that 
these courts have simply gotten lost in the fog of the ultra-complex 
Miranda doctrine. 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 652; see id. at 652 n.7. 
 47. Id. at 652. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 659–60. 
 50. Id. at 661. 
 51. Id. at 658–59.  
 52. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). 
 53. Id. at 301 n.7. 
 54.  Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 658–59. 
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III.  Comparing the Tests 
As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained in Alford, the 
courts have fractured into three approaches.55 Some define the exception 
from an objective point of view—that is, whether the officer asking the 
booking question should have known it was likely to elicit an 
incriminating response.56 Other courts consider the particular officer’s 
subjective intent, asking whether he or she intended to draw out an 
incriminating response from the suspect.57 Finally, and least common, is 
the approach of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.58 That court, like the 
Alford court in Texas, asks simply whether the question was reasonably 
related to a “legitimate administrative concern.”59 As discussed below, 
this last, least-followed approach logically—and most accurately—flows 
from Supreme Court precedent and provides the simplest path out of this 
confused corner of Miranda. 
A. Objective Should-Have-Known Test 
In his petition for certiorari, Alford characterized the objective test 
from Innis as the appropriate standard and also the majority approach. 
Five U.S. courts of appeals60 and twelve state high courts61 have adopted 
the standard. The formulation itself is straight out of Innis: “[T]he 
inquiry into whether the booking exception is thus inapplicable is 
actually an objective one: whether the questions and circumstances were 
such that the officer should reasonably have expected the question to 
elicit an incriminating response.”62 The Eighth Circuit explained: 
A request for routine information necessary for basic identification 
purposes is not interrogation under Miranda, even if the information 
turns out to be incriminating. Only if the government agent should 
reasonably be aware that the information sought, while merely for basic 
identification purposes in the usual case, is directly relevant to the 
substantive offense charged, will the question be subject to scrutiny.63 
 
 55. Id. at 658. 
 56. Id. at 655. 
 57. See id. at 655–56. 
 58. See id. at 658. 
 59. Id. at 657. 
 60. Including the First, Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit courts of appeals. See Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari at 10–11, Alford, 358 S.W.3d 647 (No. 11-1318). 
 61. Including Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, 
North Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id.  
 62. United States v. Reyes, 225 F.3d 71, 76–77 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Doe, 
878 F.2d 1546, 1551 (1st Cir. 1989)). 
 63. United States v. Brown, 101 F.3d 1272, 1274 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. 
McLaughlin, 777 F.2d 388, 391–92 (8th Cir. 1985)). 
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The First Circuit provided three examples of when an officer asking 
a routine booking question might be charged with the knowledge that it 
might elicit incriminating evidence: 
For example, asking a person’s name might reasonably be expected to 
elicit an incriminating response if the individual were under arrest for 
impersonating a law enforcement officer or for some comparable 
offense focused on identity; likewise, asking an individual’s date of 
birth might be expected to elicit an incriminating response if the 
individual were in custody on charges of underage drinking; and 
questions about an individual’s Social Security number might be likely 
to elicit an incriminating response where the person is charged with 
Social Security fraud. In such scenarios, the requested information is so 
clearly and directly linked to the suspected offense that we would 
expect a reasonable officer to foresee that his questions might elicit an 
incriminating response from the individual being questioned.64 
In United States v. Mata-Abundiz,65 the defendant was arrested and 
charged with possession of a firearm by an alien.66 After serving ten days in 
jail, the defendant was questioned by an Immigration and Naturalization 
Services (“INS”) criminal investigator who was aware of the charges but 
did not provide a Miranda warning.67 The investigator asked the defendant 
about his citizenship, and the defendant replied that he was a citizen of 
Mexico.68 The Ninth Circuit determined that the booking exception did not 
apply because the investigator’s questioning was reasonably likely to elicit 
an incriminating response—given that the defendant’s alienage constituted 
an essential element of the crime for which he was charged.69 The court 
also emphasized the fact that the questioning took place ten days after 
the suspect arrived at the jail and, therefore, did not resemble a routine 
booking procedure.70 
In United States v. Brown,71 by comparison, asking the suspect his 
name at the scene of the arrest was held not to be interrogation. The 
Eighth Circuit noted that the asking for “routine biographical data” is 
not interrogation but then embraced what it had written in an earlier 
case: “Only if the government agent should reasonably be aware that the 
information sought, while merely for basic identification purposes in the 
usual case, is directly relevant to the substantive offense charged, will the 
questioning be subject to scrutiny.”72 Thus the booking question exception, 
 
 64. See Reyes, 225 F.3d at 77. 
 65. 717 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 66. Id. at 1278. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1280. 
 70. Id. 
 71. 101 F.3d 1272 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 72. Id. at 1274 (quoting United States v. McLaughlin, 777 F.2d 388, 391–92 (8th Cir. 1985)). 
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as understood by the Eighth Circuit, is that requests for routine 
biographical data qualify unless the officer “should reasonably be aware” 
that the answers might be incriminating. In effect, this makes the Innis test 
the only one that matters. If the defense can show that the officer should 
have known that a routine question would produce an incriminating 
response, then the routine nature of the question does not matter. 
The reader might wonder what is wrong with applying the Innis 
objective test in the booking context. The results in McLaughlin and 
Mata-Abundiz seem intuitively appealing. The doctrinal problem is that 
applying Innis renders incoherent the dicta in Innis that stated the 
standard for determining when questions constituted interrogation. 
Recall that the Court said that interrogation consisted of “any words or 
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to 
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”73 If the Innis test will 
do for all questioning, then the parenthetical is unnecessary. More 
importantly, courts that apply the Innis objective test to routine booking 
questions are ignoring the holding in Muniz. Whatever the full scope of 
the overlap between the plurality and the opinion concurring in the 
result, the overlap necessarily exempts routine questions from Miranda 
and the Fifth Amendment privilege. If the question is a routine one, 
under the combined opinions in Muniz, then Innis does not apply.74 To 
subject those questions to Innis is, well, to be lost in a fog. 
The pragmatic problem with applying Innis to these routine questions 
is that it does not work very well. In United States v. Reyes,75 Reyes was 
interviewed by an INS agent—assigned to work with the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)—for the purpose of booking him 
on drug charges.76 The INS agent asked Reyes a series of questions 
directly from a DEA personal history form, including his name, where he 
was born, and his social security number.77 Reyes provided the agent with 
false information for each question, was subsequently convicted of making 
a false statement to a government agent, and sought to have his false 
responses suppressed on Miranda grounds.78 The First Circuit found that 
the questions fell within the ambit of the Miranda booking exception 
 
 73. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). 
 74. To be sure, there is a troubling footnote in the plurality opinion, which exempts from the 
routine questioning exception questions “that are designed to elicit incriminatory admissions.” See 
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 602 n.14 (1990). This has no effect on the holding that the Innis 
test is inappropriate in the booking question context, and I will discuss it in Part III.B, which deals 
with the subjective intent test. 
 75. 225 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 76. Id. at 74. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 75. 
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because the questions came directly from the DEA booking form and 
because the questions could not “reasonably be expected to elicit an 
incriminating response.”79 The First Circuit was untroubled by the agent’s 
admission that he suspected the defendant might not be a citizen.80 
Since the INS agent was reading booking questions from an official 
form, a court can easily hold that these questions do not implicate the 
Fifth Amendment privilege. One gets there either from the plurality in 
Muniz or Rehnquist’s opinion concurring in the result in Muniz. But to 
get that result under Innis requires a sleight of hand. A good marker for 
what an officer should have known about whether his question was likely 
to elicit an incriminating response, the Innis test, is whether he believes 
that the suspect will provide a false answer. Just what would an INS 
agent expect a suspect to do when the agent believes he is not a citizen 
and then asks where he was born? To pretend that this question does not 
violate the Innis standard is disingenuous. And it is unnecessary because 
Muniz settles the issue by avoiding the Innis standard entirely. 
But if the courts that apply Innis are missing how Muniz clarifies 
Innis, the courts that apply the subjective intent test are missing the 
plurality status of Muniz. 
B.  Subjective Intent Test 
As an alternative standard, Alford identified the subjective standard 
known as the intent test adopted by four U.S. courts of appeals81 and five 
state high courts.82 The standard itself is derived from footnote fourteen 
in the Muniz decision, which stated that the booking exception does not 
allow police to “ask questions, even during booking, that are designed to 
elicit incriminatory admissions.”83 Both the Fifth and the Tenth circuit 
courts have cited directly to the Muniz footnote to preface their subjective 
intent analysis.84 
In United States v. Virgen-Moreno, the Fifth Circuit found that the 
questions asked were designed to elicit incriminatory admissions and 
therefore did not fall within the Miranda routine booking exception.85 
 
 79. Id. at 77. 
 80. Id.; see United States v. Brown, 101 F.3d 1272 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Miranda 
booking exception applied where the arresting officer asked the defendant his name and the defendant 
provided a fake name, because the defendant’s name was not directly relevant to the substantive drug 
crime charged). 
 81. Including the Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals. See Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 60, at 12–13. 
 82. Including Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, New Hampshire, and Oklahoma. See id. 
 83. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 602 n.14 (1990). 
 84. See United States v. Virgen-Moreno, 265 F.3d 276, 293–94 (5th Cir. 2001); see also United 
States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 85. Virgen-Moreno, 265 F.3d at 294. 
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The defendant divulged incriminating information about his past 
residences during an interview to obtain information required by a 
202 Personal Background Form.86 The court concluded that the agents 
subjectively intended to elicit incriminating information from the 
defendant because they repeatedly asked the defendant whether he lived 
at certain addresses—one of which was later linked to the charged 
conspiracy—and once the agents were able to get the defendant to admit 
that he lived at one of the addresses, they asked him several additional 
questions to determine how long he had lived there.87 The Fifth Circuit 
explicitly based its holding on Muniz footnote fourteen, even though as 
the citation reveals, the court knew that it was a plurality opinion.88 
The Tenth Circuit also cited to the Muniz footnote fourteen in its 
booking exception analysis in United States v. Parra, but it confused the 
analysis by citing a Ninth Circuit decision which adopted the should-
have-known standard.89 As a result, it is unclear whether the court 
employed a strict subjective intent standard, an objective should-have-
known standard, or a combination of the two. The facts satisfy either 
standard because the INS agent admitted that he intended to elicit an 
incriminating response when he asked the defendant his real name, which 
he knew to be linked to an incriminating immigration file.90 Consequently, 
the court did not have to engage in any factual analysis as to whether the 
agent subjectively intended to elicit the incriminating response or should 
have known it was reasonably likely to do so. And so it remains unclear 
whether the Tenth Circuit has actually adopted the subjective intent 
standard. 
While these courts are reading footnote fourteen properly, they 
ignore that there is nothing in Muniz to suggest that there is a majority 
supporting footnote fourteen. Indeed, there is quite the opposite. For 
Rehnquist, the key to the admissibility of answers to routine questions is 
that the suspect would not feel the compulsive pressure of the trilemma 
that the privilege is designed to avoid. But this suspect-centered lens has 
nothing at all to do with the intent of the person asking the question. 
Because the Court in Innis made clear that the intent of the interrogator 
was, at best, marginally relevant to the definition of interrogation, it is 
remarkable that lower courts use a footnote in a later plurality opinion to 
 
 86. Id. at 293. A 202 Personal Background Form is a standard two-page form completed by Drug 
Enforcement Administration agents at the time of an arrest, which identifies the person being arrested 
and sets forth the actions being taken against them. Butler v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 368 F. Supp. 2d 
776, 786 (E.D. Mich. 2005). 
 87. Virgen-Moreno, 265 F.3d at 294. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Parra, 2 F.3d at 1068. 
 90. Id. at 1067. 
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deviate from that clarity. After Innis formulated the “reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect” definition, the Court 
said: 
The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the 
perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This 
focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to 
vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against 
coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the 
underlying intent of the police.91 
It is difficult to be much clearer than that. That some lower courts 
apparently believe a footnote in a plurality opinion is sufficient to ignore 
the clear language of Innis raises a jurisprudential question. Can a clear 
statement in a plurality opinion somehow “overrule” clear dicta in an 
earlier majority opinion? I think the answer to that is no. The statement 
in the plurality opinion is dicta, and I would think that dicta endorsed by 
six members of the Court in Innis should be given more weight than dicta 
endorsed by only four justices. 
If subjective intent is not the right standard, and if Innis suggests that 
the should-have-known test is inappropriate for routine booking questions, 
then what approach is left? The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals wins my 
prize for the best analysis. 
C.  Legitimate Administrative Concern Standard 
To determine whether a statement is admissible under the Miranda 
booking exception, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that “a 
trial court must determine whether the question reasonably relates to a 
legitimate administrative concern, applying an objective standard.”92 The 
court provided four main reasons for adopting the legitimate 
administrative concern standard, as opposed to the general should-have-
known standard. 
First, the court noted that imposing the alternative should-have-
known standard would render the Miranda booking exception a nullity.93 
It would require courts to analyze booking questions precisely the same 
way that they would analyze any other question. Second, the court 
reasoned that applying the should-have-known test ignores the express 
language set forth in Innis, which excluded questions that are “normally 
attendant to arrest and custody” from the meaning of custodial 
interrogation, giving rise to the Miranda booking exception.94 
 
 91. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). 
 92. Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 659–60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 
 93. Id. at 660. 
 94. Id. (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301). 
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Third, the court addressed the contents of footnote fourteen in the 
Muniz plurality opinion and determined it could not possibly be 
interpreted as requiring courts to employ a should-have-known standard 
to routine booking questions because that reading would negate all of the 
booking exception analysis set forth in the text of the plurality opinion 
itself.95 Lastly, the court pointed out that the applicable “legitimate 
administrative concern” standard affords law enforcement administrative 
efficiency; it allows them “to quickly and consistently administer booking 
procedures” and to “ensure the safety of facility personnel and other 
inmates, as well as the suspect.”96 By contrast, the should-have-known 
standard would have a burdensome effect on law enforcement because 
they would be required to analyze every single booking question before 
asking it in order to determine whether it is likely to elicit an incriminating 
response.97 
Applying the “legitimate administrative concern” standard to the 
underlying facts of the case, the court found “that the totality of the 
circumstances objectively show that [the officer’s] questions were 
reasonably related to a legitimate administrative concern.”98 As a result, 
Alford’s responses to those questions were properly admissible against 
him. The court emphasized that law enforcement has a legitimate interest 
in the identification and storage of an inmate’s property, as the Texas 
Administrative Code requires inmate property to be inventoried, 
recorded, and stored upon intake.99 Here, the relevant question pertained 
to whether the non-contraband item found in the back seat of the patrol 
car belonged to Alford.100 The court emphasized that the officer asked 
Alford the questions while booking him into jail, as well as the fact that 
after he confirmed that the flash drive belonged to Alford, it was 
immediately placed with his personal property for safekeeping by facility 
personnel.101 Additionally, the court noted that, in the Fourth Amendment 
context, the Supreme Court has determined that it is reasonable for police 
to search a person’s personal effects during booking and jailing as part of 
routine administrative procedure.102 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 661. 
 97. Id. Alford never asserted that the officer subjectively intended to elicit an incriminating 
statement from him when he asked whether the flash drive belonged to him. Id. at 660 n.27. The Texas 
court thus did not consider the subjective intent standard—whether there is an additional limit to the 
Miranda booking exception when a questioning officer actually intends to use a routine question to 
elicit an incriminating response. Id. 
 98. Id. at 662. 
 99. Id. at 661. 
 100. Id. at 662. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 661 (citing Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 (1983)). 
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The “legitimate administrative concern” standard avoids the 
doctrinal embarrassments of the other two standards. And it does so at 
no cost. It seems to reach the same result in the cases applying the other 
two approaches. 
In United States v. Mata-Abundiz, the Ninth Circuit rejected the 
government’s booking-exception argument after applying the objective, 
should-have-known test.103 But the court emphasized the fact that the 
questioning took place ten days after the suspect arrived at the jail and, 
therefore, did not bear the semblance of a routine booking procedure.104 
That is enough to show that the questioning did not sufficiently relate to 
a legitimate administrative concern; there is no need to apply the should-
have-known standard to rule that the answer was inadmissible as a 
booking question. 
In United States v. Reyes, the agent asked Reyes a series of questions 
directly from a DEA personal history form for the purpose of booking 
him.105 That is enough to bring the questions within the “legitimate 
administrative concern” standard, and there is no need to worry about 
the fact that the agent suspected that Reyes might not be a citizen. 
The key facts in United States v. Virgen-Moreno were that the 
interview was conducted after the defendant was booked and that the 
agents repeatedly challenged his answers when he did not initially give 
an address that would have incriminated him.106 The Fifth Circuit found 
that the questions asked were designed to elicit incriminatory admissions 
and therefore did not fall within the Miranda routine booking exception.107 
True enough, but why not just say that questioning that is post-booking 
and has an adversarial quality is not related to a legitimate administrative 
concern? Similarly, in United States v. Parra, the agent questioned a 
suspect, not while he was being booked, but prior to his making bond.108 
The agent admitted that he tricked the suspect into confessing that he 
had given a false name when initially booked.109 The Tenth Circuit 
seemed to hold that this intent took the questions out of the booking 
exception, but it is much easier to say that questioning a suspect after 
booking and before he makes bond does not relate to a legitimate 
administrative concern. 
Thus the Texas approach to the booking question exception seems 
to me far superior to the other approaches, both as a doctrinal and as a 
 
 103. 717 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 104. Id.  
 105. 225 F.3d 71, 74 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 106. 265 F.3d 276, 294 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 107. Id. at 293–94. 
 108. 2 F.3d 1058, 1067 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 109. Id. 
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policy matter. Yet it has been adopted only by the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals.110 Only one of two explanations is possible. First, I might be 
wrong. The reader can make that judgment for herself. But if I am right, 
then it must be that the other circuits have simply lost their way in the 
Miranda fog that the Court has created. The circuit courts adopting 
either the subjective or objective test have lost sight of the reason to have 
a booking exception in the first place: to permit police to ask questions 
required for the administrative task of booking the suspect. Since that is 
the reason, then why would anyone care about either the objective or 
subjective intent of the officer asking the question? 
The fault might not lie with the courts of appeals. In its effort to 
replace the failed voluntariness test, the Supreme Court has created a 
complex universe. Indeed, the Court itself has sometimes lost its way in 
the universe of its creation. Recall that Miranda’s avowed purpose was to 
negate the inherent compulsion that is created by custodial police 
interrogation. Yet in Innis, the Court conceded that the police tactics 
created “subtle compulsion” and then proceeded to hold that Miranda 
was not violated because the police tactic did not rise to the level of 
interrogation as defined by Miranda.111 In effect, Innis replaced the 
language of the Fifth Amendment (no person “shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself”)112 with the language in 
Miranda interpreting the Fifth Amendment. Consider the following—
remarkable—passage from Innis: 
[I]t may be said, as the Rhode Island Supreme Court did say, that the 
respondent was subjected to “subtle compulsion.” But that is not the 
end of the inquiry. It must also be established that a suspect’s 
incriminating response was the product of words or actions on the part 
of the police that they should have known were reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response.113 
Thus, if Miranda is not violated, the use of compulsion is not a Fifth 
Amendment violation. 
The Court’s confusion in Innis and the confusion surrounding the 
booking question exception that this Essay has detailed are a vindication 
of a view that Justice Thomas expressed in a dissent in a double jeopardy 
case in 1992: 
Our constitutional law has become ever more complex in recent 
decades. That is, in itself, a regrettable development, for the law draws 
force from the clarity of its command and the certainty of its 
application. As the complexity of legal doctrines increases, moreover, 
so too does the danger that their foundational principles will become 
 
 110. See generally United States v. Gaston, 357 F.3d 77 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 111. Rhode Island v. Innis, 466 U.S. 291, 292 (1980).  
 112. U.S. Const. amend. V. 
 113. Innis, 446 U.S. at 303. 
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obscured. I fear that danger has been realized here. So engrossed is the 
Court in applying the multifactor balancing test set forth in Barker that 
it loses sight of the nature and purpose of the speedy trial guarantee set 
forth in the Sixth Amendment.114 
Conclusion 
The lower courts on the booking question exception have, I think, 
lost sight of the reason the Court recognized an exception in the first 
place. The exception exists because that process, by definition, does not 
pose the same risk of compulsion as police interrogation. Once we are 
clear about the goal, once we clear away a bit of the Miranda fog, we can 
see that the Texas approach is the right one. 
I agree with the implicit assumption of the Court in Miranda that 
the voluntariness test was not doing a satisfactory job identifying 
statements that should be suppressed because of police compulsion. I 
think, for all its faults, Miranda probably does a better job ensuring that 
most statements made to police are not the product of compulsion. To be 
sure, many scholars have documented some spectacular failures of 
Miranda,115 but in the ordinary, run-of-the-mill case, I think it is better 
suited for the compulsion task than the voluntariness test (although this 
may well be damning with faint praise). What has been lost is the explicit 
focus on the goal of keeping compelled statements from being used 
against the accused. Innis was subjected to “subtle compulsion,” but his 
statements were admitted anyway. The Court has achieved (relative) 
precision at the cost of confused thinking. 
 
 
 114. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 669 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). 
 115. To save space, I cite only my favorite example, Chavez v. State, 832 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 2002), 
uncovered and brilliantly analyzed in Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, or Is It 
Irrelevant?, 10 St. Thomas L. Rev. 461 (1998). 
